TAX INCENTIVES TO EXPORTATION:
ALTERNATIVES TO DISC
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the balance of payments deficit of the United States
reached a new high of more than $34 billion.' This amount
represents nearly a 10% increase over the previous record of $31
billion set in 1977.2 Although the adverse economic consequences
of this trend are well recognized, the question of how most effectively to curb this deficit remains. One author suggests that the
greatest opportunity for improvement lies in reducing foreign
payments by stemming the rise in imports, capital outflows, and
overseas military expenditures.' While United States tax policy at
one time attempted to effect the outflow side of the balance,' more
recently programs have been aimed at increasing receipts by encouragement of export sales. This approach is designed to narrow
the gap between payments abroad for imported goods and
receipts by U.S. firms for their exports. Additionally, it is thought
that the stimulus approach may result in a number of beneficial effects on the domestic economy, such as increased employment,
greater plant utilization and an incentive to reinvest profits in the
United States.

II.

POLICY OF EXPORT TAX INCENTIVES

Tax incentives are internationally recognized as a method for
stimulating exportation. Many countries have comprehensive tax
incentive programs allowing, for example, total income tax exemption for foreign source income, specific export income exemptions,
favorable accelerated depreciation on export assets, special deductions and credits, and special reserves for market development
costs and export bad debt losses.' The United States program con' Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1979, at 6 col. 2. This figure was determined by using a balance of
payments basis that excludes federal military trade and reflects certain adjustments. According to the census basis, the American deficit was $28.45 billion.
Id&
' Considine, The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation,7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 222
(1974).
' An example of this was the Interest Equalization Tax which was discontinued in 1974;
see I.R.C. §§ 4911-4931 (repealed). This tax was designed to discourage outflows by taxing
the issuance of foreign securities on U.S. markets at rates as high as 15%.
' Trade Amendments to the Social Security Amendments of 1970: Hearings on Amendments 925 and 1009 to H.R. 17550 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance [hereinafter cited
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sists of one incentive to exporting, the Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC),' and two indirect incentives, accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit.'
This Note will consider the effectiveness of United States tax
incentives as a stimulus to exporting. First, the policies underlying incentives will be reviewed. Then, from a brief outline of the
provisions of the present tax incentive device known as DISC and
consideration of problems with the DISC program in implementing national policy and meeting international legal obligations, a
proposal for a more efficient tax stimulus will be developed.
Tax incentives to exports have two objectives: first, to increase
receipts from export sales in order to reduce the current balance
of payments deficit; and second, to expand overseas markets for
United States goods in order to improve the prospects for growth
in the domestic economy. From these objectives, two policy issues
arise. Upon whom should a tax incentive be focused, and how
much of an incentive should be given?
The issue with regard to the first policy question is basically
whether the encouragement provided by tax incentives should be
focused on present exporters in order to foster expansion of existing presence in overseas markets, or whether incentives should
be directed at firms presently selling only in the domestic market
but who might be convinced to enter world markets. The author
concurs with those who assert that incentives should operate to
expand the exporter base by focusing on small and medium companies that have remained substantially outside the export
market 8 In all probability, corporations which are already exportas Trade Amendments], 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1970) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). For
an in-depth analysis of the tax practices of various foreign countries see Export Policy:
Hearings on U.S. Programs and Facilities Designed to Support Exports Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, [hereinafter cited as Export Policy] pt. 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1978) (statement of Richard M. HNammer); Causes and Consequences of the U.S. Trade Deficit and
Developing Problems in U.S. Exports: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means [hereinafter cited as Causes and Consequences] 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (statement of the Special Committee for U.S. Exports); [1972] 168 INT'L
TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. WEEKLY (BNA) 0-1; Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R.
10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1026 (1976); Tax Reform:
Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means
[hereinafter cited as Tax Reform], 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1935, 1945 (1975) (statement of Stanford G. Ross).
' The DISC incentive is that tax on a portion of export income may be deferred. The
basic provisions are contained in I.R.C. §§ 991-997.
Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 355.
' See generally, Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 92 (statement of Richard C.
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ing will continue to do so.' It is clear that incentives calculated
upon present levels of exports, rather than on increases in export
sales, will result in a windfall to corporations exporting at present." In constrast, incentives focused on companies that have
never exported before will initially expand manufacturing output,
benefit the current United States trade position, and may
establish a base for future sales through the acquisition of export
experience by new exporters.
In considering the second policy question-how much of a tax
break should be given-it would appear that any stimulus to the
new exporter must eliminate or be sufficient to overcome the
obstacles presented by inexperience with foreign markets and
government regulation of exports. In testimony before a Senate
Subcommittee, Richard Fenton of the Special Committee for
United States Exports (SCUSE) outlined five major impediments
facing the small exporter:1 (1) a negative attitude on the part of
small or medium companies which view exporting as risky and
complicated; (2) a general lack of knowledge concerning how to do
business under complicated trade regulations; (3) higher costs
associated with exporting and the lack of foreign marketing experience; (4) foreign buyer resistance; and (5) foreign competitive
factors. This last category includes programs to assist foreign exporters in overseas markets, such as marketing research assistance, 1 a vast array of foreign tax incentives,1 8 and foreign principles of
taxation unfavorable to United States exporters in particular.1 Fenton and others have called for a coordinated national
Fenton); Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Paul A. Volcker) and at 12
(statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
' Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 1945 (statement of Stanford G. Ross); see also Id. at 2319
(statement of Michael J. McIntyre); Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of
Nathaniel Goldfinger).
" Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 1945 (statement of Stanford G. Ross); Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 39 (statement of Stanley Surrey) and at 65 (statement of Nathaniel
Goldfinger).
11 Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 98.
"2One example of such a program is the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO).
This organization provides information to Japanese firms on activities and opportunities in
other countries. It aids in market research and centralizes the information process which
enables Japanese firms to move efficiently into foreign markets. Export Policy, pt. 3, supra
note 5, at 43 (statement of Robert D. Hormats).
'a See supra note 5.
" The United States and countries of the European Common Market use different
methods of taxation to raise a major portion of revenues. The United States relies heavily
on direct taxes levied on legal or natural persons, typically in the form of income or profits
taxes. As a result, there is no basis consistent with this general principle of taxation for
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export policy to eliminate excessive obstacles to reaching foreign
markets.15 While this improvement would eliminate significant impediments to smaller exporters, such coordination cannot alone
balance other advantages which foreign exporters enjoy in overseas markets. At a minimum, then, any tax incentive given should
be sufficient to counter the tax advantage enjoyed by foreign exporters, thus equalizing the competitive position of U.S. exporters
in foreign markets. Equalization was a major objective of the
DISC, the initial United States foray into the export tax incentive
area. The effectiveness of the DISC will be considered in the following three sections.
III.

POLICY OF THE DISC LEGISLATION

DISC provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were enacted as
part of the Revenue Act of 1971, after a compromise between the
House and Senate versions of the bill."6 In order to improve the
balance of payments position of the United States, the DISC was
proposed with the objective of increasing exports. The DISC was
designed to minimize the burden of U.S. taxes on exports to
counter the competitive effects of remission of certain taxes for
exported goods under the tax systems of a number of foreign
countries. In addition, the DISC was to serve other functions.
distinguishing between profits on exported goods and profits on goods consumed in the
United States. EEC countries on the average derive more than half of their total revenue
from indirect taxes levied on goods and services. Remission of taxes on exports is easily
calculated. Statistics on the character of foreign taxes is available in FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT
ON DISC, infra note 50, at M-11.
The unfavorable impact on U.S. exports of the difference in these systems of taxation
results from the recognition in international practice, confirmed in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, of each nation's right to exempt exports from indirect taxation and to
subject imported goods to local indirect taxation. See Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustments:
Problems and Proposals, 2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 85 (1970). In effect, U.S. exports are
burdened by direct taxes on the manufacturer at their origin and then by indirect taxes at
their destination. Exports from countries which remit indirect taxes, in contrast, are subject to taxation primarily in the country of destination.
15Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 97. Richard C. Fenton states:
[Ilt is imperative that the U.S. government give priority to and assume an active
role in stimulating exports, particularly among smaller companies. In doing so,
however, all branches of government must develop a clear, comprehensive, consistent, and positive export policy underscoring a serious commitment to exports.
See also Tariff and Trade Proposals: Hearings on Tariff and Trade ProposalsBefore the
House Comm. on Ways and Means [hereinafter cited as Tariff and Trade Proposals],91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 499 (1970) (statement of David M. Kennedy).
" Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 501, § 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
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DISC originated as part of the government response to a general recession in the American economy in 1971.21 It was anticipated that DISC would strengthen the economy in several ways.
First, DISC was supposed to increase foreign demand for goods
produced in the United States. The DISC legislation provided a
tax break on profits from exported goods which allowed exporters
to sell abroad at a more competitive price. These tax savings improved the profits and cash flow from exporting, but were limited
in ways designed to promote the financial and marketing resources necessary to overcome non-tax export impediments. 18
Also, DISC was intended to increase employment in the United
States. In order to benefit from these provisions, exported goods
are required to be produced in the United States.' The increased
foreign demand for American goods would therefore require increased production in the United States, resulting in new jobs.
These new jobs would then stimulate domestic consumption which
would further encourage manufacturing in the United States. To
the extent that DISC was successful, the requirement that goods
be produced in the United States would influence businesses to
build new plants in this country rather than abroad. Finally, it
was believed that DISC would give the private sector a clear indication that exports were a national priority.2 This would focus the
attention of American industry on opportunities in foreign
markets.2
Congress recognized that export incentives could raise problems under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Article XVI of the GATT prohibits subsidies to exports.' Thus

*

Note, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 94 (1977).
* Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 81 (statement of John R. Babson).
*' I.R.C. § 993(c)(1)(A). Subsection (C) requires also that not more than 50% of the fair
market value can be attributable to articles imported into the United States.
"By stimulating exports, the DISC should not only lead to fuller utilization of presently
unutilized capacity; it should also, over time, affect managerial decisions on the location of
new plants in a direction favorable to the U.S." Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 53
(response of the U.S. Dep't of Treasury); see also id. at 10 (statement of Paul A. Volcker).
21 Supra note 15.
u Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Paul A. Volcker).
n General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
GATT is an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The primary
purpose of the GATT is the gradual reduction of tariff barriers. GATT Article XVI, concerning export subsidies, reads in pertinent part as follows:
Subsidies
Section A-Subsidies in General
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any
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Congress chose a deferral concept, rather than an exemption, in
the hope of avoiding characterization of the DISC program as an
export subsidy prohibited by the GATT."'
IV.

DISC PROVISIONS

25

The DISC provisions operate as an export tax incentive by permitting export manufacturers to defer taxation on a part of their
income derived from export sales. In accordance with applicable
DISC provisions, a manufacturer establishes a separate corporation to serve as a conduit for its export sales. This subsidiary, the
DISC, is usually little more than a "paper" entity, the activities of
which are confined to exporting. The DISC itself pays no income
tax. 6 Instead, shareholders of the DISC (usually only the parent
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing .... In any case in
which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting
party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting
party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility
of limiting the subsidization.
Section B-Additional Provisions on
Export Subsidies
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter,
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31
December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 ....
Section A is the original Article XVI as enacted in 1949. Section B was added at the
Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties in 1955. Article XVI imposes on a subsidizing nation the duty to notify and consult with effected parties. In addition, Article XXIII permits
parties to initiate consultation with the subsidizing party, and to submit the issue to the
Contracting Parties as a whole. The Contracting Parties may authorize suspension of concessions to the subsidizing nation as they consider appropriate. Also, unilateral emergency
suspension of concessions is provided for in Article XIX.
For an extensive discussion of GATT and the issue of export subsidies, see K. DAM, THE
GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); Anninger, DISC and
GATT. InternationalTrade Aspects of Bringing Deferral Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391
(1972); Comment, 41 Mo. L. REV. 180 (1978); Note, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 87 (1972).
" Considine, supra note 3, at 225.
0 For a more complete discussion, see R. FEINSCHREIBER, DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL
SALES CORPORATIONS (1978); R. RHOADES & E. STEINBERG, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN
RELATED TRANSACTIONS, §§ 4.41-4.60 (1978); Note, 11 GA. L. REV. 902 (1977), reprinted in 7
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 629 (1977); Note, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 93 (1977); Note, 56
MINN. L. REV. 407 (1972).
- I.R.C. § 991.
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manufacturer) are taxed on the basis of distributions, both constructive and actual. Only part of the DISC's income must be
recognized by the parent; the balance is deferred. Moreover, the
period of deferral can be indefinite if the DISC continually expands exports.' This is equivalent to an interest free loan of taxes
to the exporter."8
In order to qualify as a DISC, the export corporation must meet
six requirements: 1) it must be a domestic corporation;' 2) it can
have only one class of stock;3 ' 3) the capital account must be at
least $2,500;1 4) 95% or more of gross receipts must consist of
"qualified export receipts";"2 5) 95% or more of assets must be
"qualified export assets"; ' and 6) it must elect to be treated as a
DISC.3 In addition, Treasury regulations require that the DISC
maintain a separate bank accounts5 and separate books and
records." These requirements are designed to limit substantially
all of the DISC's transactions and assets to export-related activities. Frequently the DISC is a separate entity only in a technical
sense, possessing a simple organizational structure and relying
upon a related manufacturer to supply export products. 7
Because a DISC is usually controlled by a related producer, a
major determinant of the amount of tax incentive is the amount of
total profits from an export sale which may be deferred through
the DISC. In order to link the incentive to the added burdens of
export activity without providing a general subsidy to the manufacture of export goods, the parent company is entitled to deferral
on the sales profits but not on the manufacturing profit made on a
given export item." This distinction requires the determination of
an appropriate transfer price on sales to the DISC from the
" Tariff and Trade Proposals,supra note 15, at 528 (statement of John S. Nolan).
" R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 25, at 1.
" I.R.C. § 992(a)(1).
" I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(C).
/d.

I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(A). The definitions of qualified export receipts, I.R.C. § 993(a)(1), and
of qualified export assets, I.R.C. § 993(b), are extensive. Comprehensive definitions are required in order to assure that the DISC incentive accrues only with respect to export activities of the DISC.
I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(B).
I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(D).
u Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a)(6), T.D. 7273, 1974-2 C.B. 229.
Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a)(7), T.D. 7273, 1974-2 C.B. 229.
Note, 11 GA. L. REV, 902, 906 (1977), reprintedin 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 629, 633
(1977).
W R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 25, at 5.
'
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parent company or other related manufacturer. The DISC provisions establish special intercompany pricing rules which allow objective, "safe haven" bases of profit allocation as alternatives to
the general provisions of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code."
Under the special provisions of Section 994 of the Code, an exporter can maximize the sales component of profit, i.e. tax-deferred
DISC profit, under three different pricing methods. These provisions apply only to sales of export property to a DISC from a
seller which controls the DISC. Under the first method, the taxable income of the DISC is 40/o of the "qualified export receipts" of
the sale plus 10% of the "export promotion expenses" related to
such sale. 0 The second method sets the taxable income of the
DISC at 500/0 of the combined taxable income from exports of the
DISC and the related seller, plus 10% of the related export promotion expenses." Under this second method, taxable income from
exports can be calculated using a marginal costing approach. This
allows the parent to allocate production costs on the basis of products or product lines between export sales through a DISC and
parent company sales of the same item.' The third method determines profit on the basis of the price actually charged, but this
price is subject to challenge as artificial under Section 482 of the
Code." Use of one of the first two methods will often result in a
transfer price below the arm's length bargain price. By reducing
the price and profits of the seller a greater proportion of profit is
attributed to the DISC when the goods are resold abroad, result" Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 108 (statement of Richard C. Fenton). I.R.C. § 482
employs an arm's length bargaining test which considers the amount which was charged or
would have been charged in independent transactions with unrelated parties under the
same or similar circumstances. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(d)(3) and 1.482-2(b), T.D. 6952, 1968-1
C.B. 221 and 224. This section empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to reallocate the tax
consequences of a transaction and therefore it is not considered a "safe-haven," objective
allocation test.
, I.R.C. § 994(a)(1). Under this method, a DISC with $500,000 in qualified export receipts
would have allocated to itself $20,000 of the combined export income of the DISC and
parent, plus 10% of the export promotion expenses.
" I.R.C. § 994(a)(2). Under this method, if the combined taxable income of the DISC and
its parent is $500,000, $250,000 plus 10% of the export promotion expenses would be allocated to the DISC.
" Note, 11 GA. L. REV. 902, 907 (1977), reprinted in 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 629, 634
(1977). See also Kauder, Marginal Costing for DISCs: An Explanation and Analysis of
Treasury's Proposed Regs, 38 J. OF TAX; 304 (1973); R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 25, at
275; R. RHOADES & E. STEINBERG supra note 25, at § 4.46(6)(b)(iii).
" I.R.C. § 994(a)(3). See supra note 39.
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ing in greater tax deferral on the sale." The first two methods
also provide a "safe haven" from reallocation by the IRS under
Section 482.
As originally enacted, DISC legislation provided that one half of
the DISC's income from export sales would be deemed distributed
to DISC shareholders."8 Tax on the remaining half of the income
was deferred unless an actual distribution exceeded the assumed
50% distribution.
The DISC scheme was subjected to much criticism for inefficiency, because its benefits applied to exporters whether or not
their exports were increasing. In response, Congress, as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, amended the DISC provisions by instituting an incremental approach to calculating tax-deferred income. 6 These calculations add considerable complexity to the
DISC. A complete explanation of them is outside the scope of this
paper. 7 The general effect of the provisions is to increase the
amount of export income which is taxable to DISC stockholders to
" Note, 56 MINN. L. REv. 407, 482 (1972).
" A "deemed distribution" is the statutory term for DISC income which is currently taxable to the shareholders even though not actually distributed. Id. at 430.
" Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 638,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 263, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3159.
" For an example of the computations involved see R. RHOADES & E. STEINBERG supra
note 25, at § 4.43(2)(e). In summary form the total combined base period and 50% income
distributions may be expressed as follows:
ti = taxable income

tipp f taxable income attributable to base period activity
egr = current year export gross receipts
bp = base period export gross receipts level
dd = total deemed distribution attributable to the base period rule and the 50% of
DISC income rule
dd = tibp + '/z(ti - tibp)
where tibp

=

ti x bp

egr
(I/2 ti X bp) + 1/2 ti
egr

then ddand dd

-

I/b ti x (b

+ 1)

Thus, where bp = 0 the distribution is 50% of the DISC's taxable income. Conversely, where bp = egr, the deemed distribution would be the total amount of DISC income.
Therefore, no DISC income would be subject to tax deferral benefits. Note, supra note 37, at
916 n. 78.
Base period is defined as follows: for years beginning before 1980 the base period shall be
the taxable years beginning in 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975, and for years beginning after 1979,
the base period shall be the taxable years beginning in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
calendar years preceding such calendar year. I.R.C. § 995(e)(5).
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the extent that current DISC receipts are not significantly
greater than average receipts during a four year base period.
Therefore, unless the DISC continues to increase its export sales,
the benefits of deferral will diminish. This creates an incentive to
increase export sales. Small DISCs-those with adjusted taxable
income of $100,000 or less-are exempted from these incremental
deferral provisions. 8
V.

EFFECTIVENESS OF

DISC LEGISLATION

As noted, the objectives of DISC legislation were to increase
exports, to equalize the burdensome effects of the United States
tax system in relation to foreign tax systems, and to increase
domestic production and employment. Throughout its relatively
brief history, DISC legislation has been criticized in the United
States and abroad. Within the United States, an initial criticism of
the DISC was that it would result in unjustified profits to existing
exporters on goods which would be exported even without incentives being offered. The 1976 amendments withdrew this aberration, but the added complexity of incremental deferral added force
to another early concern that the small or new exporter would
avoid the DISC because of the extensive legal and accounting expertise required to reap the benefits of a DISC. Present criticism
of the DISC is centered on the issue of whether the revenue lost
by the DISC incentive is justified by the degree to which exports
have increased under the program. As will be seen in the discussion that follows, consideration of this issue is impaired by the
many variables affecting export development.
Whether or not the DISC has been effective at increasing exports, another issue to be considered is the complaint by several
nations that the DISC concept violates United States obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Members of the European Economic Community and Canada have
asserted that the DISC incentive constitutes an export subsidy
which threatens to imbalance reciprocal trading concessions
under the GATT.
A.

Increase in Exports
Several factors have resulted in the dramatic growth of AmeriI.R.C. § 995(f)(1).
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can exports since the inception of the DISC program. 9 Independent of the rapid growth of DISCs, three other developments have
influenced export figures, thereby impeding a definitive assessment of the increase in exports attributable to DISCs. First, adoption by the United States of the floating exchange rate in 1971
allowed the dollar to be devalued with respect to foreign currencies. This may have caused the price of American exports to
become more attractive to foreign buyers.50 Second, inflationary
price increases for many products' distort aggregate export
figures as well as the value of receipts earned by individual
DISCs. Because the incremental deferral concept of the 1976
amendments to the DISC is keyed to receipts unadjusted for inflation, a margin of deferral may be attributable to inflation. Finally,
this period has seen a continuing increase in world trade volume,
accompanied by comparatively strong economic expansion overseas which has resulted in increased demand for U.S. exports.2
The interplay of these three broad influences on U.S. exports and
DISCs has made it difficult to accurately measure whether the
DISC has been a cost efficient incentive to exports. The result has
been conflicting conclusions by government and private sources
on this issue.
Reports by the government have generally been critical of the
DISC as an effective stimulus to exportation. The House Budget
Committee, in a 1975 report, estimated that less than 1% of the
total increase in exports during the period from 1971-1975 was at" See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM: DETAILED
DESCRIPTION AND SUPPORTING ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS, HOUSE COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND
MEANS COMM. PRINT No. 65, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 521 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENTS 1978 TAX PROGRAM, reprinted in [1978] 193 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. WEEKLY

(BNA) M-1.
Exports for the period 1970-1977 are as follows:
(in billions)
1970-43.224
1974- 98.507
1971-44.130
1975-107.592
1972- 49.778
1976-114.992
1973-71.339
1977-120.163
U.S DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 1978 874 (1978).
" PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 321; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES COR-

(1978), reprinted in [1978] 203 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S
(BNA) M-1 [hereinafter cited as the FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISC].
PORATION LEGISLATION

U.S. WEEKLY

"1 PRESIDENTS 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 321; FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISC,

supra note 50, at M-1.
52 id.
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tributable to the DISC program." The Treasury Department, in
its most recent report to Congress concerning the DISC, estimates that the program increased exports by $2.9 billion at a cost
in a lost tax revenue of $1.146 billion for fiscal year 1976.M This
report includes the estimate that in 1976 less than 3% of the annual growth in total U.S. exports was attributable to DISC." Although this demonstrates an increase over the Budget Committee
estimates for the earlier 1971-1975 period, a Treasury report concerning President Carter's tax proposals concluded that "DISC is
.. .an anachronism in a world of flexible exchange rates, and a
'
costly and wasteful anachronism at that.""
A major element of the Treasury's criticism of the DISC is the
impact of general export incentives on the value of the dollar
under floating exchange rates. Their view is that to the extent
DISC stimulates exports, increased export demand will cause the
dollar to appreciate in relation to foreign currencies. Appreciation
of the dollar acts as a stimulus to import purchases in the United
States, offsetting the effect of DISC on the overall balance of
trade.5 7 The Treasury report recommends that the DISC program
be gradually phased out, as outlined by President Carter in his
1978 message to Congress concerning tax proposals. The report
further suggests that increased loans and loan guarantees through
the Ex-Im Bank would permit more flexibility in export policy to
M
avoid unintended stimulus to imports5
Reports from the Special Committee for United States Exports
(SCUSE), a lobbying group which advocates the retention of the
DISC, conflict with government reports. In testimony before the
House Ways and Means Committee, David Garfield of SCUSE
estimated that DISC added $7-9 billion in exports, and, taking into
account the multiplier effect, the DISC program contributed an
"

STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET,

INTERNATIONAL SALE CORPORATIONS

94th

CONG., 1st SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC

(DISC) 6 (Comm. Print 1975). See also Note, supra note

37, at 909.
" FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON

DISC, supra note 50, at M-1.

S1&.at M-3.
" PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM. supra note 49, at 319.
17 FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISC, supra note 50, at M-3;
If we artificially stimulate exports, at the very same time and by the very same
technique with floating exchange rates, we are going to stimulate imports.
Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 2321 (statement of Michael J. McIntyre).
" PRESIDENTS 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 318. See also Message from the President: Proposalsfor Tax Reductions and Reform, H. Doc. No. 283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1978).
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additional $21-27 billion to the U.S. Gross National Product. 9 As
this contrast suggests, there is variance among the figures for
DISC effectiveness. Uncertainty on this issue clearly still exists.
B.

Equalizing Tax Systems and Incentives of Foreign Nations

Many foreign systems of taxation have inherent export incentives built on principles of taxation which exempt a large portion
of export revenues.' For example, France, unlike the United States,
does not tax subsidiaries having their situs outside France, and,
unless otherwise provided by treaty, 950/o of the dividends of a
subsidiary are exempt from tax to the parent." This is in recognition of the territoriality principle of taxation dating back to the
beginning of the century in the French system. Under this system
only income arising in France is taxed. As another example, Ireland
totally exempts from corporate taxation profits attributable to exported goods produced in Ireland."2 Other tax incentives of foreign
countries include favorable accelerated depreciation on export
related assets,63 rebates or the allowance of special reserves for
export market development expenses," and remission of valueadded taxes on exported goods. 5
DISC was enacted by Congress as a means of equalizing the
competitive position of American producers who are taxed on
" Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 2281 (statement of David Garfield).
'0 See supra notes 5 and 14.
61 Trade Admendments, supra note 5, at 24.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 22. For example, Spain allows companies which export more than 50% of their production to take accelerated depreciation of up to 40%. SPECIAL COMMITEE FOR U.S. EXPORTS.
INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISC AS AN ELEMENT OF U.S. POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1977) reprinted in [19771 168 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. WEEKLY (BNA) 0-1, 0-6
[hereinafter cited as SCUSE].
" Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 22. Australian law provided a tax rebate (credit) of
42.5% of an expenditure incurred for export market development and also permits full
deduction of the expenditure incurred. Id. This credit was applicable between the period July
1, 1968 and June 30, 1974. 5 BOARD OF INLAND REVIEW, INCOME TAXES OUTSIDE THE UNITED
KINGDOM, Group 13 Australia 15 (1977). Spain allows corporations engaged in exporting to
establish special reserves equal to 50% of their net profits from export operations for (1)
future acquisitions of assets to be used in the export business and (2) future expenditures for
overseas advertising and marketing. SCUSE, supra note 63, at 0-6.
' The Value-added tax (VAT) is a form of national sales tax which is the primary source of
general revenues in many European tax systems. As a so-called "indirect tax," it is levied on
consumption rather than on income and savings. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1979, at 1, col. 1. As its
name implies, a value-added tax will generate most of its revenues at stages of production
where materials are converted into finished goods. The effect of a remission can, therefore,
be quite substantial even if the exported goods become subject to value-added taxes in the
country of their destination.
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their worldwide income, in relation to foreign exporters, who are
often exempt from tax on exported goods. Although Canada and
members of the European Economic Community have made a formal complaint that DISC violates GATT as a direct subsidy to exportation, critics of the DISC at home continue to question the effectiveness of the DISC as an equalizer to the export incentives of
foreign tax systems.6
In a study conducted by SCUSE, DISC failed miserably as a tax
equalizer. SCUSE simulated the sale of merchandise under the tax
systems of various foreign nations and through a DISC.17 The increase in after-tax profit of the American exporter using DISC
was found to be insignificant in comparison to the increase in
after-tax profit resulting under the foreign tax systems considered."
Although little information concerning the effectiveness of
DISC was available following its enactment, the European Community and Canada filed a complaint in 1972 with the Contracting
Parties of GATT alleging that DISC amounted to a subsidy prohibited by Article XVI of the Agreement. The United States filed
a counter complaint claiming that the territoriality based tax
systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands constituted a
tax subsidy for exporters of those countries. Four panels of experts were appointed by GATT to study the complaints and in
1976 the results of their study were announced. The tax systems
of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as DISC were
found to be export subsidies.9 The GATT Council discussed the
At present there appears to be a general consensus that our major trading competitors offer greater assistance and better incentives to their exporters than we do
to our own .... Tax incentives are another area in which we do not appear to be
competitive. A study conducted by the Special Committee for U.S. Exports reveals
that other nations tax practices significantly improve the price competitiveness
and profitability of their exports. Our major tax incentive, the DISC program, did
not compare favorably.
Export Policy, pt. 3, supra note 5, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. H. John Heinz III); see also
Id. at 102 (statement of Richard M. Hammer.)
07 Causes and Consequences, supra note 11, at 345.
Id. The increase in after tax profit on a $10,000 sale attributable to export tax incentives
were as follows:
Belgium
$
300
Brazil
$
200
France
280
Spain
65
The Netherlands 290
Ireland
1000
U.S. Insignificant
SCUSE, supra note 63, at 0-3.
9 It was found that these practices by all countries constituted prima facie cases of
nullification or impariment of benefits under GATT. United States Tax Legislation (DISC);

1979]

TAX INCENTIVE ALTERNATIVES

panel's findings in 1977, but has not yet adopted them. If findings
are adopted, the GATT Council could make recommendations to
0
the parties concerning an appropriate settlement."
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the DISC at tax equalization,
SCUSE issued a report in 1977 urging that the DISC nonetheless
be retained because, as the only general export tax incentive of
the United States, the DISC program could provide leverage in
negotiating equitable international standards for export tax incentives." This "bargaining chip" justification for retaining the DISC
was rejected by the Treasury in its analysis of the President's tax
proposals. The Treasury asserts that if DISC is repealed the
United States would have the right to expect other countries to
comply with GATT in their tax practices. If other countries do not
conform to GATT, goods benefitting from subsidies could be subjected to countervailing duties." Regardless of the pros or cons of
this "bargaining chip" argument, there seems to be some agreement that DISC cannot compete favorably with foreign tax incentives.
C.

Increase in Employment

The third main objective of DISC legislation is to increase
employment in the United States. According to SCUSE, DISC has
been successful on this point. Testifying before the House Ways
and Means Committee, David Garfield of SCUSE stated that between 280,000-300,000 new jobs may be attributed to DISC during
its first few years of operation. 8 Garfield added that the unit cost
of jobs created as a result of DISC was less than that of public service jobs created under other federal programs.7 Employment
figures of FMC Corporation showing that it added 3,197 export
related jobs between 1971 and 1974 as a result of the DISC legislaIncome Tax PracticesMaintained by France;Belgium; and the Netherlands, Reports of the
Working Panels, GATT DOCS. L/4422-4425 (Nov. 2, 1976). See also GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES
IN

1976-77 (1977); 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 706 (1977).
1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 324.
" SCUSE, supra note 62.
n PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 325.
m PRESIDENT'S

Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 2281 (statement of David Garfield).
,' The Senate recently voted unanimously to approve a $1.6 billion program to create
310,000 public service jobs-at an average cost per job of over $5000. The
demonstrated job-creating benefits of DISC show a cost per each job created or
preserved of less than $4000 ....
Id. at 2282.
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tion were given to the Committee as an example of the positive
5
impact of the DISC incentive.1
Although such evidence would support a positive view of the
DISC by organized labor, the AFL-CIO has been critical of DISC
legislation from its inception. This early opposition was based on
the view that DISC creates a tax loophole benefiting primarily large
corporations and that DISC provided no incentive to increase exports."' More recently, the Department of Labor has joined in
advocating elimination of the DISC."
In summary, the DISC does not seem to be meeting the objectives for which it was enacted. Although it is evident that export
revenues have increased since the enactment of DISC, a substantial amount of this increase might have occurred in any event.
More significant is the view expressed by the Treasury that in a
world of floating currency exchange rates, an export incentive
which reduces the price of United States exports will tend to be
neutralized by increased imports due to appreciation of the dollar.
DISC has failed to compete favorably with tax incentives for foreign nations, and there is considerable uncertainty as to the impact of DISC on domestic employment. Even so, the DISC has
been found to violate United States obligations under the GATT.
At home, elimination of the DISC has been supported by the
Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury"8 and the
program receives increasing scrutiny by the Congress. For these
reasons, a fresh look at tax incentives to export is needed. The remaining portions of this Note will analyze one existing proposal to
achieve more effectively the goals of the DISC, and then an alternative to the DISC will be developed and proposed.
lb

Id. at 2245 (statement of Robert H. Malott). FMC Corp. is a diversified producer of

machinery and chemicals with headquarters in Chicago, Illinois.
"' Trade Amendments, supra note 5, at 64 (statement of Nathaniel Goldfinger).
" U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM OPTION PAPER No. VIII (1977) reprinted in [19771
177 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) M-1, M-2.
This aversion of DISC could be explained in the following way. According to a House
Budget Committee staff study using Bureau of Labor statistics, the $400 million increase in
exports created 15,950 jobs in 1974. However, the billion in revenues lost under DISC would
have generated 112,500 jobs in defense, 120,000 jobs in health, 150,000 in education, or
240,000 public service jobs. Another thing to consider is that to the extent that increased exports cause the dollar to rise in relation to foreign currencies, this would make imports seem
cheaper. Because U.S. imports tend to consist of labor intensive products, the result is that
DISC may easily displace more jobs than it creates. Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 256 (statement of Robert M. Brandon).
78 TAX REFORM OPTION PAPER No. VIII, supra note 77.
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VI.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A tax incentive to exportation which would alleviate the major
problems exposed in the DISC approach may be gauged by several
criteria: 1) maximization of exports at an acceptable cost in lost
tax revenue, and without incidentally stimulating imports; 2) consistency with United States obligations concerning subsidies
under GATT; and 3) simplicity in operation to encourage use
without undue dependence on professional assistance.
A.

Maximization of Exports-Minimization of Revenue Loss

A tax incentive designed to maximize exportation must be cost
effective in terms of lost tax revenue resulting from allowances,
exemptions, or deferrals. The cost in lost tax revenue under DISC
was reduced by the incremental deferral approach adopted by the
1976 amendments, yet the cost of DISC is projected to be $1 billion in 1978.1' Therefore, an alternative to DISC will have to
achieve greater leverage by continuing to reward only increases
in exports and, further, by directing incentives against the most
burdensome costs of entering the export market. To minimize
neutralization by increased imports in a world of floating exchange rates, an export incentive should offset only the added
costs of developing and reaching export markets, in comparison to
the costs of developing domestic markets. Incentives should not
lower the foreign price of exports below the comparable price of
such goods on the domestic market. Rather, incentives should offset only the incremental costs of reaching the foreign market.
B.

Violation of GATT

An alternative tax incentive should not constitute a subsidy
under the terms of GATT." The tax deferral concept of the DISC
has been found to be such a subsidy in violation of GATT Article
" FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISC, supra note 50, at M-6. Revenue cost estimates and
projections from 1972-1983 are as follows in millions:
1972 $
350
1978 $
1,000
1973
730
1979
1,190
1974
1,130
1980
1,320
1975
1,170
1981
1,360
1976
1,430
1982
1,460
1977
880
1983
1,590
See supra note 23.
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XVI. 1 GATT Art. XVI gives no detailed definition of "subsidy."
However, a GATT working party issued a list of eight practices
which will be considered subsidies. Proscribed practices pertinent
to tax incentives analysis include:
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters;
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct
taxes or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial
enterprises;
(d) The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges
or taxes, other than charges in connection with importation or
indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods
if sold for internal consumption; or the payment, in respect of
exported goods, of amounts exceeding those effectively levied at
one or several stages on these goods in the form of indirect
taxes or of charges in connection with importation or in both
forms;
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credits at rates below those
which they have to pay in order to obtain the funds so employed;
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred
by exporters in obtaining credit."
The GATT panel examining DISC made extensive reference to
this list in comparing the effect of the DISC with the activities
proscribed by the working party. Therefore, until further harmonization of the export impact of tax systems of other nations is
achieved, an export tax incentive proposal should be assessed in
light of the activities proscribed by the working party."
See text accompanying note 69 supra.
9 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 185, 186-187 (1961).
U As part of the Tokyo Round negotiations, delegations of major industrialized nations
and certain developing countries had agreed in principle on a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as of December 27, 1978. One of the Code's major provisions is that
signatories will seek to avoid causing injury or serious prejudice to the domestic industry of
another signatory, or nullification of GATT benefits accruing to the signatory caused by export subsidies. Annex A to the Code presents an illustrative list of export subsidies. The list
presents two alternative provisions pertinent to the legitimacy of the DISC and future export tax incentives:
Version 1(d). The full or partial exemption, remission or deferral, specifically
calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or
payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.
"
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C.

Tax Simplification

The 1978 tax program of President Carter characterized the
DISC as one of the "most complex" areas of the Code" and proposed
elimination of the program to aid the goal of tax simplification. Experts have acknowledged that the costs of legal and accounting
expertise needed to apply the complex DISC provisions are a substantial export barrier facing small manufacturers." Therefore, in
order to be attractive to United States traders, incentive provisions must be conceived and drawn in light of an observation contained in the tax program that "it is essential to our system of
self-assessment ... that the law be understandable to the people
to whom it applies. ' ' " An alternative tax incentive should be
understandable to businessmen without dependence upon lawyers
and accountants.

VII.

TWO PROPOSALS TO THE PROBLEM OF FINDING
AN ALTERNATIVE TAX INCENTIVE

A.

World Trade Credit
1.

Outline and Policy of the Credit

In June of 1978, the Presidential Task Force on Export Policy,
headed by Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps, proposed a new
tax incentive plan developed around the concept of a "World
Trade Credit. 87 Recognizing some of the shortcomings of DISC,
the plan is intended to be an incentive primarily to small and
Version 2 [In lieu of paragraph (d) .... the following paragraph would be added at
the beginning or the end of the text:
The relationship of direct tax practices to export trade and pricing, and
to Article XVI of the General Agreement, has been a subject of concern
to many signatories to this Arrangement. It is agreed that the Contracting Parties should examine practices and GATT findings in this area
with a view to supplementing this list and formulating comprehensive
recommendations for adoption and implementation by signatories].
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra. Mr. Graham stated that he believed
Version 2 would be the one finally agreed upon. Conversation with Thomas R. Graham,
Senior Asociate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, formerly Deputy
General Counsel for the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, May 25,
1979.
PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 71.
" Export Policy, pt. 6, supra note 5, at 111 (statement of Richard C. Fenton).
PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 68.
TAX RECOMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S TASK FORCE ON EXPORT POLICY, PROPOSAL
FOR WORLD TRADE CREDIT AND DISC MODIFICATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
PROPOSAL]; reprinted in [1978] 211 INT'L TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) N-1.
'
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medium exporters. It would also be expected to reduce revenue
loss in comparison to DISC. The plan has three basic elements: 1)
retention, with modification, of DISC; 2) establishment of a World
Trade Credit which would allow exporters a tax credit equal to
50% of their incremental export market development costs; and
3) establishment of an export development trust fund to be administered by the Commerce Department." The plan is designed
to reduce the cost of DISC by eliminating excessive profit margin
on DISC sales and to channel most of these savings to smaller
businesses.
The first element of the plan proposes a modification of the
DISC intercompany pricing provisions." Under the proposal, the
50% profit allocation rule and the arm's length pricing option
would both be eliminated, in favor of the remaining "safe haven"
rule allocating 4% of export receipts plus 10% of export promotion expenditures to the DISC." This reduction in DISC revenue
loss would be used to finance a new tax credit. The Task Force
proposal does not advocate phasing out the DISC; rather, it presents an alternative which is directed to new exporters.
The heart of the Task Force's proposal is the establishment of
what would be called a "World Trade Credit." This Credit would
be equal to 50% of incremental export development expenditures.
As with the DISC, the incremental approach rewards only increases in marketing efforts. Unlike the DISC, which bases its incentive primarily on actual sales of exports, the Credit rewards
marketing efforts alone. The Credit goes another step further by
allowing expenses of reaching markets in countries to which an
exporter has not previously exported to be credited even if total
development expenditures do not increase. Creditable export
development expenses are defined as "ordinary and necessary
business expenses incurred by the taxpayer, either directly or by
contract, whose principle purpose is to advance the sale, lease, or
other distribution of its own export property outside the United
States."9 ' The Credit could be applied against the total U.S. tax
Id
Over 60 percent of DISC benefits are received by parent companies having more than
$250 million in assets. The average profit margin on DISC sales, under the present alternative pricing provisions, was 14.0 percent in 1976. The average margin on sales to the
domestic market was 6.5 percent in the same period. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISC, supra
note 50, at M-6 and M-11.
91 TASK FORCE PROPOSAL, supra note 87. See also supra note 41.
1IdL at N-2. Among the types of expenditures classified as export development expenses
are the direct and incidental costs of:
"
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liability of a firm, in comparison to the DISC, which ties its advantages to export profits.
The Credit would be limited to $100,000 per year, and not to exceed $300,000 over the five year period from 1979-1984.9' By limiting the Credit, the task force proposal is aimed at reducing the
tax cost of the incentive and making the Credit attractive primarily to small and medium exporters." By allowing a tax credit
against all income, but limiting its amount, the World Trade
Credit is designed to overcome the start-up costs and uncertainty
facing the new exporter. Further, the costs and complexity of a
separate export corporation are avoided.
The third element of the proposal would establish an export
development trust fund to be administered by the Department of
Commerce. This fund would finance the promotion and expansion
of American exports through "trade mission, export educational
efforts, tailored export expansion programs, and other types of
overseas promotion and domestic stimulation efforts."'" In order
to maintain the fund, the proposal would earmark 100/0 of the
taxes paid on DISC income for investment in the fund.95
a. Market research and the marshalling of market information.
b. Preparation and distribution of samples and technical data.
c. Advertising preparation and media, and other dissemination.
d. Participation in Public and Private trade fairs, missions, and exhibits.
e. Maintaining sales, market development, instructional service, and technical
representatives aborad.
f. Preparing and submitting bids for commodities, goods, equipment, and
construction, technical or engineering projects.
g. Packaging and package design and labelling.
h. Opening or maintaining warehousing, sales and service establishments abroad.
i. Post sale instruction and warranty servicing.
j. Foreign patent, trademark and copyright registrations.
Id. cf. "exporting promotion expenses" under the DISC; I.R.C. § 994(c). These expenses
could include a portion of shipping costs in computing the DISC income allowed deferral.
" Id at N-1.
" Id. The Task Force's estimation of the cost of the credit is as follows:
Maximum Annual
5-year
Average Annual
Credit of
Revenue Loss
Revenue Loss
$ 50,000 (total 150,000)
$100,000 (total 300,000)
$150,000 (total 750,000)
Id. at N-2.
'

$1.5 billion
$2 billion
$3.5 billion

$300 million
$400 million
$700 million

Id.

SId. If DISC were modified in 1976 according to this proposal, taxes paid on DISC income

would have been about $500 million per year and .the trust fund would have received about
$50 million that year.
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Analysis of the Task Force's Proposal

The first step of the analysis is to determine the effectiveness
of the World Trade Credit proposal in maximizing exports and
minimizing revenue loss. The proposal includes a modification of
the DISC legislation which will reduce tax revenue loss arising
from DISC. At the same time the proposal calls for a maximum
credit for incremental export development expenditures of
$100,000 per year, not to exceed a total of $300,000 for five years.
At this level, the Task Force estimates that the revenue lost from
the World Trade Credit will be $400 million per year for a total of
$2 billion over five years." Considering that the proposal expects
to reduce the cost of DISC by 50 percent, 97 but including the revenue loss from the World Trade Credit, the overall tax cost of the
proposal may be expected to increase annually but at a lower level
than the present DISC program alone. Based on Treasury Department projections, this would mean a revenue loss in 1980 of approximately $1.06 billion, in comparison to over $1.3 billion under
DISC. 8 The question remains then whether the increase in exports will justify the large revenue loss.
The Task Force's proposal fails to project the increase in exports which may be expected from the World Trade Credit, and
such a computation is well beyond the scope of this paper." Even
so, the Task Force feels that there will be an increase in exports
due to the Credit. The Credit is specifically designed to encourage
new exporters to enter foreign markets and to encourage smaller
existing exporters to enter additional foreign markets. Also, the
proposal may be more effective because executives of smaller exporters may more readily evaluate a $100,000 credit against total
tax liability, in comparison to the cumbersome deferral concept of
DISC. This proposal therefore may be expected to expand the export base, as well as exports, by encouraging initial sales by new
and smaller exporters.
The cost of the proposal in lost revenue remains high; it would
exceed one billion dollars by 1980. This reduction from the $1.3
billion estimated cost of DISC alone is a proper direction of
change. However, the proposed World Trade Credit is not based
" Supra note 93.
7Id.

See supra note 79.
For the computations used in projecting DISC impact on exports see FIFTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON DISC, supra note 50, at M-19.
"
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upon sales, but rather on the expenses of export marketing efforts. To the extent these marketing efforts fail, resources are
wasted. If marketing efforts result in sales, crediting the costs of
promotion will enable exporters either to reduce export prices,
which would raise the problem of an unintended stimulus to imports, or to receive excessive profits based on reduced costs. In
the latter case, as excessive profits are eliminated by the ceilings
on the Credit, exporters formerly eligible for the Credit might be induced to move into the modified DISC. If this occurs, the cost of
the DISC will increase. So long as the DISC is continued, an increasing number of exporters may become dependent on incentives to remain in overseas markets. In view of the tax cost of the
proposal and the unexplored assumption that the costs of the
Credit and the DISC are independent, the proposal cannot be endorsed as a long-range approach to making U.S. exports competitive.
The second point of analysis concerns whether the proposal violates GATT. As noted before, Article XVI of GATT prohibits subsidization of exports,' but does not define what constitutes a
"subsidy." Therefore, the World Trade Credit must be evaluated
with respect to the list of practices considered export subsidies
under an interpretation of Article XVI(4) by a GATT working par01
ty.
The remission of direct taxes "calculated in relation to exports"
is one practice proscribed by the working party102 which is relevant to the validity of the World Trade Credit. Technically, direct
taxes have not been remitted by the Credit, but at least one
author suggests that "remission" could mean either the exemption
or abatement of a tax otherwise due or the refund of all or part of
a tax already assessed or paid. ' Another proscribed practice is
exemption from taxes, "in respect of exported goods."''
The
World Trade Credit is arguably an abatement of a tax otherwise
due, or an exemption. Moreover, the effect of the Credit is
perhaps even more favorable than a remission because no payments in anticipation of liability are made. It is less clear that the
Credit is "calculated in relation to exports." As noted above, the
'® See supra note 23.
101

See text accompanying supra note 82.

I'
Id. at item (c).
i Anninger, supra note 23, at 403.
104 See text accompanying note 82, item (d) supra.
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credit is based on export marketing expenses without regard to
whether or to what extent goods are actually exported. This
absence of relation to actual exports, however, results in the
Credit appearing more like a "direct subsid[y] to exporters,"
another proscribed practice. 15 Interpretation of the scope of this
provision becomes circular by reference to the word "subsidy." It
is submitted that, consistent with the present view of DISC under
the GATT, a "direct subsidy" may include forgiveness of direct
taxes as well as payments. Therefore, on several grounds the World
Trade Credit would be a violation of the GATT. Also the DISC,
which has been found to violate the GATT, would be retained
under the Task Force Proposal.
The final question is whether the World Trade Credit proposal
is consistent with the policy of tax simplification. By proposing
modification of DISC rather than its elimination, the proposal runs
contrary to the position of major government agencies that DISC
is so complex that it must be eliminated.' °0 The modification is a
substantial move towards tax simplification by reducing three
alternative profit allocation methods to one well defined method.
Although many complexities remain in the DISC, a major advantage of the proposal is that exporters discouraged by DISC have a
more simple alternative in the World Trade Credit.
The World Trade Credit by itself does satisfy the goal of tax
simplification. Since the Credit is intended to be independent of
DISC, companies can take advantage of the credit without forming a separate export corporation. In this way the added costs and
complexity of the DISC can be avoided by the small exporter. In
comparison to DISC, the complexity of computing incremental
development expenses remains, but provisions limiting the use of
income generated by the incentive are avoided by allowing the
Credit against all other income. 1' The tax simplification aspect of
the World Trade Credit is one of the strong points of the proposal.
In conclusion, the World Trade Credit is a step in the right
direction. It is aimed at small and new exporters, it is fairly simple
to apply, and it should result in an increase in exports and expansion of the exporter base. The special export development fund
has the potential for coordination of export efforts and efficient
Id. at item (b).
PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 71.
107Compare:qualification as a DISC requires, interalia, that 95% of the gross assets of the
10'

DISC be "qualified export assets." I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(b).
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development of foreign markets. Resources of the fund could also
be devoted to assisting exporters with domestic regulations to affirm the high priority of exports in trade policy. The proposal may
be criticized for its cost in terms of revenue loss and because it
would probably be found to violate the GATT. Further, the proposal would be strengthened by including gradual elimination of
the DISC.
Elimination of DISC: Continuation of Deferral Concept

B.
1.

General Provisions of the Proposal

It has been noted that DISC is considered by many experts to
be expensive, complicated, and of uncertain effectiveness. Any
new tax incentive should eliminate the DISC. Considering the problems of DISC and the deficiencies in the World Trade Credit proposal, an improved tax incentive would replace the DISC with a
more effective deferral concept. In addition, primary emphasis
should be placed on negotiations to balance direct and incidental
foreign tax incentives on exports. A proposal embodying these elements will be developed in the remainder of this Note. An outline
of the key provisions of this proposal is as follows:
-Repeal of the DISC legislation
-A new 100% deferral of incremental export income for a
period of three years
-Maximum deferral of $200,000 per year
-Repayment of deferred taxes after 3 years, with interest.
-Election to deduct or to capitalize and amortize export development expenses
-Assertion of a claim under GATT against foreign tax incentives in order to emphasize negotiations
a.

Elimination of the DISC

In light of the large revenue loss and the uncertainty of benefits, the DISC has been shown to be ineffective at implementing
national policy. DISC was enacted to achieve a number of noble
goals: to increase exports, to equalize the effect of foreign tax
systems in export markets, and to increase employment in the
United States. Although the DISC should be commended for making U.S. manufacturers aware that exporting is a national priority, it has largely failed to attain more specific objectives. The
following proposal will build upon some of the groundwork laid by
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DISC, but DISC should be eliminated in order to reduce lost revenues and refocus export policy.
b.

Deferral of Incremental Export Income

The heart of the present proposal is enactment of legislation
which would allow an election by U.S. manufacturers to defer
100% of incremental export income. This differs from the DISC
because the proposal allows deferral directly to the manufacturer;
no intermediate export corporation is required.
Under the plan, net income from export sales for the tax year
will be compared to the average export income of the preceding
three years. Current export income which exceeds this base period
average will reflect increased sales and some component of inflation. The tax on this excess, referred to as the incremental export
income, will be computed at the applicable tax rate but will be
totally deferred for three years. For example, assume that the
plan would become effective in 1980 and that a manufacturer's net
export income is as follows: $3,000 (1977), $5,000 (1978), $7,000
(1979), $15,000 (1980). As of 1980 the base period average export
income would equal:
$5,000 (1978) + $7,000 (1979) + $15,000 (1980) = $9,000 (base
period average)
3
$20,000 (export income for 1981) - $9,000 (base period average) $11,000 entitled to deferral1
The moving average computation and calculation of the amount of
income entitled to deferral would work the same way in 1982. The
moving average concept tends to smooth out extraordinary export
fluctuations in years prior to enactment of the plan. Even so, provision must be made to discourage corporations that are already
exporting from reincorporating or forming new subsidiaries to get
100 A formula for this proposal would be as follows:

N1 =
N2 =
N3 =
N =
ABPI
D =

previous year's export income
Export income from 2 yrs. before
Export income from 3 yrs. before
Current year's export income
= Average base period income
Amount deferred from taxation

(N1 + N 2 + N 3 ) = ABPI
3
N - ABPI = D
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a base period average export income figure of zero. This loophole
could result if income attribution rules are not considered with
respect to incremental export income.
Losses should be allowed currently. Losses would also be allowed
in computing the base period average export income in order to
give the exporter the benefit of other parts of the Internal Revenue Code in addition to benefits under the proposal.
c.

Deferral Limited to $200,000

The incremental export income on which tax could be deferred
would be limited to a maximum of $200,000 over the life of the proposal. This ceiling on the deferral is similar to the credit ceiling
imposed by the World Trade Credit proposal. The purpose of the
ceiling in both proposals is to direct tax relief to the smaller or
newer exporter and to avoid a windfall to large manufacturers
which are already exporting. The deferral is in effect a loan to the
exporter to enable him to overcome barriers to initial or increased
exportation.'" It is believed that the relative benefits of, and need
for, the proposal are greater for smaller firms with fewer resources and limited credit. Only $200,000 can be deferred, and the
balance of export income will be taxed at normal rates even if this
ceiling is reached in less than three years.
d.

Payment of Tax Liability After Deferral

The tax on incremental export income is deferred for three
years. The exporter must begin to repay the deferred tax liability
three years following the year in which the tax was computed.
The deferred tax liability will be determined in the year that export income is received or accrued at rates based on earnings in
that year. After three years this amount of tax will be added to
the tax due in that later year.
By deferring 100% of incremental export income the proposal is
designed to "lure" small to medium sized firms into exporting in
order to expand our exporter base as well as exports. The benefit
of total deferral is tempered by the limited, three year term of
this deferral. Because the deferral reduces the total tax liability of
the manufacturer, without regard to future export earnings, the
small exporter may conceive of the deferral as a loan to help offset
added marketing start-up and penetration costs. This differs from
'" See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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the World Trade Credit proposal which would confer a permanent
grant through the credit. It is hoped that the temporary deferral
will stimulate long-range export marketing efforts. Once experienced in the market, smaller exporters will have overcome structural barriers to exporting and may be expected to continue to
export to otherwise profitable markets after expiration of the
deferral period.
Repayment would be in a lump sum or in installments for up to
ten years, with interest for the period of deferral, and on the installments, if chosen. In order to make the plan attractive to the
exporter other than as an alternative source of credit, the interest
rate on installments should be set below the average market rate
to smaller manufacturers. This reduced rate can be justified as a
reflection of the reduced risk of default on amounts due as taxes,
especially where the deferral is allowed only to the extent export
sales are increasing.
Charging interest on payments for deferred tax serves two purposes. First, this avoids the argument that the United States is
granting export assistance at a rate below the market, in view of
the risk involved, which could be a violation of various parts of
Article XVI of GATT. Second, interest payments will reduce the
amount of revenue lost as a result of this proposal.
e.

Elective Tax Treatment of Export Development
Expenditures

Export development expenses are those sustained primarily to
advance export sales. "' These will be treated under this proposal
in the same manner as research and development expenditures
under the present Internal Revenue Code.1 Section 174 of the
Code allows research and development expenditures to be deducted as expenses in the year which they are incurred, "2 or as
deferred expenses chargeable to a capital account and later amortized. " '
Export development expenditures are analogous to research
and development expenses because, although they are incurred in
.1 This proposal utilizes the same definition of export development expenditures as the
World Trade Credit Proposal. For a more in-depth look at what constitutes export development expenditures, see supra note 91.
I.RC. § 174.
I.R.C. § 174(a).
"3 I.R.C. § 174(b)(1).
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one year, they benefit following years as well, if new overseas
markets are established. The initial cost of reaching an export
market and developing product acceptance may generate sales in
future years which can support gradual amortization. If, however,
the product is not accepted overseas, development expenses may
be advantageously deducted immediately. It is therefore believed
that the exporter should have the option of deducting export
development expenditures in the year incurred or capitalizing and
amortizing these expenses over future years.
f.

ProgramLimited to Five Years- "Sunset Provision"

This proposal includes a "sunset provision" which would terminate the plan after a five year period if it has not been renewed by
Congress. Therefore, an exporter must begin to defer income
within the five year period, inclusive of the year enacted. Upon
expiration of a consecutive three year period following the first
year of election, no additional income could be deferred. If this
proposal were enacted in 1980 and a company did not elect deferral in that year, it could begin its three consecutive years of eligibility for deferrals in 1981, 1982, 1983, or 1984. Export income in
years in which deferral was not elected would be included in the
three year base period described earlier.
If the proposal was not renewed after 1984, the program would
terminate. In five years, a reasonably sound assessment of the
plan's effectiveness can be obtained to determine whether the
plan should be continued. Interim evaluations should be developed
by the Treasury Department and reported to Congress, as is presently done to analyze the effectiveness of DISC. If the reports by
the Treasury are unfavorable, the plan would automatically terminate in 1984 unless extended in order to allow time for the development of modifications. The "sunset provision" of the proposal
is designed to force a decisive review of policy and program effectiveness at a reasonable time in the future. Moreover, assessment
and terminaiion or modification of the proposal in five years may
act as a stimulus upon-the executive branch and foreign nations to
engage in productive negotiations for the harmonization of world
tax systems with respect to exports.
g.

Emphasis on Negotiations for Removal of Foreign Tax
Incentives

To combat the vast array of tax incentives granted by foreign
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countries, this country must continue to recognize GATT obligations and press its claim that some foreign tax systems, especially
those utilizing the territoriality principle, are violative of Article
XVI(4) of GATT. This proposal would include a mandate to the
Executive to enter tax harmonization negotiations. This constructive approach could develop a long-range means of achieving
global trade on fair terms in the spirit of the GATT, as compared to the present situation where findings of tax imbalance by
a GATT Working Party go formally unrecognized.
2.

Analysis of the Continued Deferral Proposal

A statistical estimate of the cost of this proposal and its potential to increase exports is beyond the scope of this paper, but
some general comparisons are possible. This proposal will involve
some loss in tax revenues. The revenue loss, however, will be considerably less than the $1 billion for DISC and $400 million for the
World Trade Credit. The cost will equal the present value differential between the current cost of money to the Treasury and the
reduced interest rate levied on the payment of the deferred tax
liability. Under this proposal, the deferred taxes will definitely be
repaid, unlike the DISC, where deferral can be indefinite, or the
World Trade Credit, where the credit permanently excludes an
amount of export income from taxation. It seems clear even at this
point, therefore, that the amount of revenue loss will be reduced.
On the other side of the balance-maximization of exports-this
proposal is directed specifically at newer or smaller companies.
This increase may be less than the increase originally attributable
to DISC, but the cost of the increase, in terms of revenue loss, will
be much smaller than under the DISC. Of at least equal significance is the potential of this proposal to stimulate the exporter
base of smaller firms at less cost than the World Trade Credit.
The proposal is dangerously close to being a violation of GATT
Article XVI. It would eliminate the DISC and with it the argument that DISC, in effect, grants a permanent deferral which
amounts to a tax exemption specifically proscribed by the GATT
Working Panel.1 The present proposal permits deferral for the
definite term of three years, then the exporter must begin to
repay the deferred taxes. Also, interest accrues on the deferred
.14See supra note 82.
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taxes, which diminishes the objection that deferral amounts to an
interest-free loan.
There is a remaining argument that the exporter receives some
economic benefit calculated with respect to exports through the
present value differential during deferral. This suggests an abatement or partial exemption proscribed by GATT. A GATT Panel
could find that this proposal exceeds the line of legality under the
GATT. Yet this proposal is probably more defensible than either
DISC or the World Trade Credit. For this reason, the proposal
represents a superior position from which to bargain for a new
subsidies code or consider countervailing measures.
The final concern is tax simplification. Although more simple
than DISC, this proposal is more difficult than the World Trade
Credit. The deferral concept central to the DISC legislation is
utilized in the proposal, but exporters get the deferral without
having to form a separate corporation. The proposal will reduce
the exporter's paperwork and legal costs. Unlike DISC, exporters
would not have to continue to invest in qualified export assets"' in
order to retain export incentives. Because the deferral is calculated using net export income from sales, the exporter computes
net income from export sales using the regular costs of production.
The World Trade Credit is simpler than the continued deferral
concept. This results from the ease with which any credit can be
computed in comparison to deferral which may involve a number
of years with varying total income. It may be easier for businesses
to readily appreciate the immediate benefits of a credit. The continued deferral proposal requires computation of moving average
base period export income, and determination of deferral repayments using installment payback if elected. Both the World Trade
Credit and the proposal present the common factual difficulty of
segregating indirect export development costs. On the whole, it
seems that the World Trade Credit would be more simple to use
than the continued deferral proposal.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As the United States' trade deficit continues to grow and the
value of the dollar declines in relation to foreign currencies, the
world will closely observe this country's efforts at corrective mea...
Supra note 33.
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sures. There are a number of proposed remedies. Some advocate
focusing attention on increasing exports; while others suggest
that this country should strive to alleviate the problem of rapidly
increasing imports.
With the enactment of the DISC, the Congress determined that
our tax policy would be to increase exports by utilizing an export
incentive as a partial solution to the trade imbalance. The uncertain effectiveness of DISC and the incumbent loss of revenue from
the program have created a situation where an alternative tax incentive now appears necessary.
Any tax incentive to exportation must be efficient as a matter
of domestic policy, and fair as a matter of foreign policy. This
Note has examined the present export incentive -the DISC, and a
new proposal, the World Trade Credit-with these two objectives
in mind. From this examination a proposal has been developed
which better meets these objectives. The proposal would reduce
the revenue loss of incentives and refocus incentives to increase
the exporter base of the United States by encouraging smaller
firms to attempt exporting. It is hoped that the analysis and proposal of this Note will generate additional thought concerning the
role of tax incentives in the master objective of a coordinated national export policy.
Timothy A. Peterson

